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Cheney: Appeal

APPEAL
I.

FORM AND REQUISITES

A.

Non-Compliance with Supreme Court Rules
Phillips Refrigeration Co. v. Commercial Credit Co., was
an action brought by the plaintiff to recover under an alleged
express contract for the storage of the defendant's equipment
and, in the second cause of action, for services in picking up,
transporting and repairing certain equipment.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a nonsuit at the conclusion of the plantiff's testimony 2 and the
plaintiff appealed on eleven exceptions, of which exceptions
nine and ten were abandoned. The South Carolina Supreme
Court found no merit in the remaining exceptions. The court
noted especially that exceptions 1-3, 6 and 73 were not in compliance with supreme court Rule 4, Section 6.4 Section 6 re1. 256 S.C. 500, 183 S.E.2d 330 (1971).
2. The trial court listed its reasons for granting the nonsuit as: (1) the
lack of evidence to establish the contract alleged in the first cause of action and
(2) in regard to the second cause of action, a finding that Phillips had operated
on a commission rather than a flat fee basis.
3. Exceptions 1-3, 6 and 7 as recorded in the transcript at 457-458, 461
were as follows:
(1) That His Honor erred in granting defendant's motion for an involuntary nonsuit in that the testimony and inferences to be drawn therefrom
were sufficient to give rise to causes of action alleged in the complaint.
(2) That His Honor erred in granting an involuntary nonsuit against the
plaintiff in that the testimony and inferences to be drawn therefrom were
solely considerations for the jury.
(3) That His Honor erred in granting defendant's motion for an involuntary nonsuit upon the evidence, not upon the insufficiency of the evidence,
the error being that the evidence and all inferences were considerations to
be determined by the jury, not the trial judge.
(6) That His Honor erred in granting defendant's motion for an involuntary nonsuit, the error being that the only reasonable inference to be
drawn from the testimony was that it was sufficient to be submitted to the
jury, the testimony showing the basis and facts which gave rise to the
causes of action.
(7) That His Honor erred in granting defendant's motion for an involuntary nonsuit in that His Honor performed the function of the jury by
passing upon the weight of the testimony and its sufficiency in granting
said motion.
4. S.C. CODE ANN., Sup. Ct. Rule 4, §6 (1962).
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quires each exception to be a concise statement of law or fact,
complete within itself, and the court found these particular
exceptions to be too vague for their consideration. The court

stated: The first three exceptions are mere general complaints that the court
erred in granting a nonsuit. They do not discriminate between the
causes of action, and, in effect, merely assert that the evidence was
sufficient to require submission of the case to the jury. These five exceptions completely disregard Rule 4, Section 6 of the Rules of this
Court, and are entirely too vague and indefinite to require consideration by us. 5

The court's present position as to exceptions reiterates the
long-standing principle that:
[E]very ground of appeal ought to be so distinctly stated that
[..
the court may at once see the point which it is called upon to decide
without having to 'grope in the dark' to ascertain the precise point
6
at issue.

B.

Issues Not Raised in the Court Below
In Maus v. Pickens Sentinel Co., 7 the plaintiff sold a

printing press to the Pickens Sentinel Company. The press
was to be delivered from the plaintiff's place of business in

Tennessee to the Sentinel in Pickens, at which time the Sentinel was to off-load the press and store it until the plaintiff

could install it. The press was shipped and, upon its arrival,
was dropped and damaged by defendants Hinkle and Mur-

phree who were engaged by the defendant, Pickens Sentinel
Company, to off-load the press.
The Pickens Sentinel Company was eliminated from the

case on motion of non-suit, and the court below, through a
jury trial, found for the plaintiff. The defendants Hinkle and

Murphree appealed. Their appeal brief cited numerous times
the judge below had allegedly interjected himself into the
trial proceedings and, by allegedly so doing, influenced the
jury's verdict.8 The supreme court, however, held it could not
5. Phillips Refrigeration Co. v. Commercial Credit Co., 256 S.C. 500, 502503, 183 S.E.2d 330, 331 (1971).
6. Brady v. Brady, 222 S.C. 242, 245, 72 S.E2d 193, 194 (1952) ; Gordon
v. Rothberg, 213 S.C. 492,. 50 S.E2d 202 (1948); Pate v. C.I.T. Corp., 199
S.C. 244, 19 S.E.2d 107 (1942); Elkins v. S.C.&.G.R. Co., 59 S.C. 1, 37 S.E.
20 (1900).
7. 258 S.C. 6, 186 S.E.2d 809 (1972).
8. Brief for Appellant at 8-13.
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review these interjections because they were not the subject
of objection at the trial, nor had appellants used them as a
ground for their motion for a new trial.9
The court also held, on the same principle, that the appellants were precluded from objecting to an instruction of
the trial court where no objection was made below and, likewise, that an exception which appellants had made to a request to charge was waived since that exception was not
argued in their appellate brief.' 0
Additionally, the supreme court would not review the
evidence concerning the appellants' question as to their own
actionable negligence since the appellants' motion for a directed verdict had been on the sole ground of the plaintiff's
contributory negligence. The sufficiency of the evidence in
regard to the appellants' actionable negligence was not raised
at the appropriate time below and, therefore, could not be
reviewed on appeal."
Bass v. Honey Fried Chicken Corp.12 reaffirmed the requirement that issues must be raised below before they are
available at the appellate level. The plaintiff in Bass brought
action under an alleged breach by the defendant of a stock
subscription contract whereby the defendant was to sell shares
of its capital stock to the plaintiff. The lower court found that
there was a valid contract and that, when the plaintiff had
tendered the agreed sum in accordance with the contract, the
defendant had refused to transfer the stock. Judgment below
was awarded to the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.
On appeal the defendant attempted to show that the
plaintiff had failed to prove the existence of a written agreement and, therefore, the judgment of the trial court should
be reversed.' 3 The supreme court, however, refused to allow
the defendant to pursue that course of argument by stating:
Any failure by plaintiff to prove compliance with legal requirements
in this respect is not available to defendant on this appeal, because

9. Maus v. Pickens Sentinel Co., 258 S.C. 6, 11, 186 S.E.2d 809, 811 (1972).
10. Id. at 14, 186 S.E.2d at 812.
11. Id. at 15, 186 S.E.2d at 813.
12. 257 S.C. 430, 186 S.E.2d 243 (1972).
13. Brief for Appellant at 2-12.
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the lack of a written subscription was not pled as a defense, nor
14
was it otherwise presented to or passed upon by the circuit court.

Although City of Greenville v. Bryant1 5 will be discussed
in more detail under another section of this article, it should
be noted that the supreme court pointed out in Bryant the
same basic principle discussed above and refused to allow the
appellants to challenge the validity of certain sections of the
city code as unconstitutional because the issue was not raised
in any of the proceedings below. 16
II.

SUFFICIENCY OF FACTUAL FINDINGS BELOW

Eargle v. Moak'7 was an action in equity to determine
the correct boundary line between adjoining lands. Both the
appellant and the respondent relied on their respective conflicting plats. No request was made for a court ordered survey.
Concurrent findings were made by the master and trial
judge in the respondent's favor and the supreme court held
that it was well settled that such concurrent findings would
not be disturbed unless there was no evidentiary support for
the findings or they were against the clear preponderance of
the evidence.' In making its decision the court relied on
Metze v. Metze,19 which stated very plainly the principle re20
ferred to by the court concerning concurrent findings.
In New FoundationBaptist Church v. Davis,2' the plaintiff church's sanctuary floor collapsed during funeral services
and the church brought an action against the contractor for
negligent construction. Both actual and punitive damages
were sought. The verdict of the jury was for $6500 actual
damages. On appeal the appellant claimed the respondent had
failed to prove actual damages to the extent awarded. The
14. Bass v. Honey Fried Chicken Corp., 257 S.C. 430, 432, 186 S.E.2d
243, 244 (1972); e.g., Waltz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 233
S.C. 210, 104 S.E.2d 384 (1958); Davis v. Greenwood-United Tel. Co., 253
S.C. 318, 170 S.E.2d 384 (1969); McCormick v. State Capital Life Ins. Co.,

253 S.C. 544, 172 S.E.2d 308 (1970).
15. 257 S.C. 448, 186 S.E.2d 236 (1972).
16. Id. at 453, 186 S.E.2d at 237.
17. 257 S.C. 359, 185 S.E.2d 894 (1971).
18. Id.
19. 231 S.C. 154, 97 S.E2d 514 (1957).
20. Id. at 157, 97 S.E.2d at 515.
21. 257 S.C. 443, 186 S.E.2d 247 (1972).
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supreme court found, however, that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding. 22 In addition, the supreme
court found that since the jury had only awarded actual damages, appellant's question concerning punitive damages was
now moot and any error harmless. 23 Appellant also took exception to the judge's refusal to give a charge concerning
the time that had elapsed from the contractor's work until
the accident. The supreme court, however, found that the appellant's counsel at the trial level had been very unclear in
his request for charge and had never presented the request
24
to the trial judge in the accepted form.
As noted in New FoundationBaptist Church, the supreme
court will not disrupt the decision of the lower court if the
conclusion reached below is sufficiently supported by the
evidence.
The trial court decision in Zimmerman v. Graves,25 an
action involving title to land, was challenged on appeal on the
ground that the judgment below was without sufficient factual support. The supreme court disallowed this challenge by
stating:
Since this is action at law, the conclusions of fact by the lower court
are binding upon this court, unless they are without evidentiary

support.

20

In Zimmerman, the special referee and the trial judge concurred in their findings and the supreme court concluded their
judgment had ample factual support.2 7 In a similar action to
try title to a strip of land in Spartanburg County, the supreme
court, Littlejohn, J., held in Dillard v. Blackmon 2 that the
evidence supported the concurrent findings of the Master in
Equity and the trial judge.
22. Id. at 446, 186 S.E.2d at 249. The issue of application of the collateral
source rule was also involved in this case. The court felt that, although the rule
applied, the evidence supporting the verdict was sufficient even without applying the rule.
23. Id.
24. Id. The court indicated that even if counsel had followed correct procedure in submitting the request, it would have been without merit based on
the evidence presented at the trial level.
25. 256 S.C. 471, 182 S.E.2d 885 (1971).
26. Id. at 474, 182 S.E.2d at 886.
27. Id.
28. 258 S.C. 158, 187 S.E.2d 643 (1972).
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Using the well established principle concerning review
of the findings below, the court once again made its position
clear in Terry v. Pratt.29 Terry had made application to the
Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) Commission for a license
to sell liquor on the retail market at a location near the City of
Anderson. The ABC Commission conducted a hearing into the
application and denied the license because the "location is
unsuitable for the sale of alcoholic liquors" 30 since the "locality
was not under proper police protection." 31
After the license was denied by the Commission, the decision was reviewed on writ of certiorari by the judge of the
tenth judicial circuit. The Commission's decision was affirmed
and Terry appealed to the supreme court.
The supreme court stated that the issue of granting the
license "ordinarily rests in the sound discretion of the body
or official to whom the duty of issuing it is committed.13 2 The
ABC Commission has been given the authority to refuse to
grant a license if it is of the opinion that the place is not
suitable33 and, therefore, the supreme court refused to review
the Commission's findings of fact without some showing that
the findings were wholly unsupported by the evidence. 34 In
speaking to the lower court's review, the supreme court stated
that "[j]udges of the courts of common pleas are bound by
this same rule and limitation." 35 The supreme court, therefore,
affirmed the decision of the court below.
B.

External Factors Hampering Juror's Deliberation

State v. Lake3 6 brought forward on appeal the question
of the interference of external forces on the due deliberation
29. 258 S.C. 177, 187 S.E.2d 884 (1972).
30. Id. at 177, 187 S.E.2d at 885.
31. Id.
32. Id.

33. S.C.

CODE

ANN. §4-53(2) (1962). The appellant also challenged the

constitutionality of §4-53 (2) by contending it was an unconstitutional delegation
of power from the legislature to the commission. The supreme court held, however, that the statute was complete on its face and the legislature had only
given the commission the discretion in the execution of the statute. For the
commission's authority to refuse the license due to improper police protection
see S.C. CODE ANN. §4-37 (1962).
34. Terry v. Pratt, 258 S.C. 177, 187 S.E.2d 884 (1972).
35. Id.
36. 257 S.C. 407, 186 S.E.2d 256 (1972).
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of a juror. The defendant was convicted in the trial court of
armed robbery and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. He appealed on the ground that a mistrial should
have been declared because a woman juror had been emotionally distressed due to her concern about who was going
to care for her children while she was at the court. She was,
alleged the defendant, unable to give the due deliberation to
the defendant's guilt or innocence which he was entitled to
have.
The trial judge refused the motion for mistrial, stating
the juror's distress had been sufficiently eliminated. The
judge was informed of the juror's anxiety after the jury had
been deliberating for some five hours and the judge was preparing to send them to supper. The juror's husband had to
go to work at 3:00 a.m. the following morning and she was
concerned that there would be no one to care for her children
if she was not at home by that time. The judge, with the

permission of both the defense and prosecution, allowed her
to call and make arrangements for her husband to stay at
home if she had not returned by 3:00 a.m. It was the trial
court's conclusion that this action relieved any interference
with her deliberation.
The supreme court held that the granting or denial of a
mistrial motion was within the trial judge's discretion and
that his discretion would not be disturbed in the absence of
abuse which amounted to an error of law. 37 At the time the
trial judge allowed the juror to call her husband, the defense
made no motion for mistrial. Defense counsel did express concern that the juror's deliberation might be affected. The
actual motion for mistrial, however, came just thirteen minutes before the verdict was returned. The supreme court found
that there was no information in the record to indicate that
the trial judge's understanding of the situation was not
correct and, therefore, there was no reason to disturb his
decision.38
III.

EFFECT OF GIVING A CHARGE OUT OF SEQUENCE

In Dickard v. Merritt39 the defendant's truck had collided
with the plaintiff's car after the truck had a blowout and the
37. Id. at 409, 186 S.E2d at 257.
38. Id. at 411, 186 S.E2d at 258.

39. 256 S.C. 458, 182 S.E.2d 886 (1971).
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defendant had lost control of his vehicle, causing it to veer
over the centerline into the plaintiff's path. The speed limit
was 35 m.p.h. and evidence showed the defendant was traveling as fast as 50 m.p.h. when the blowout occurred. The trial
court found for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.
The supreme court found there was evidence of the defendant's actionable negligence and his motion for a directed
verdict or judgment non obstante veredicto was properly
denied below.
The defendant also asserted that the trial judge had
erred to the defendant's prejudice when he gave a charge
out of context. 40 The trial judge had unintentionally overlooked charging the jury that the violation of traffic statutes
constitutes negligence per se. When this was pointed out to
him, the judge included a standard instruction concerning
it in his supplemental charge. The defendant, however, felt
this was prejudicial because his requested charge in connection with this area, which had already been charged earlier,
was not repeated again in conjunction with the standard
charge. 41 The trial judge stated at the time of the defense
objection that he had already given the requested charge to
the jury, and the defense did not further pursue the matter.
No contention of prejudice was raised at that particular time
but, even so, the supreme court found the jury was not in any
way misled to the defendant's prejudice. The court stated:
It is an elementary proposition of law that the charge of a trial judge

must be considered as a whole and the individual portions thereof
42
viewed in the light of and in context with the rest of the charge.

IV.

ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION BELOW

The defendant in State v. Gorie43 was convicted of manslaughter in the shooting death of his wife following an argument outside their home. He was sentenced by the judge of
the fifteenth judicial circuit, who was then presiding over
the eighth circuit, where the trial was conducted. There was
no appeal or motion for a new trial or judgment n.o.v. at that
40. Brief for Appellant at 21-24.
41. Id.

42. Dickard v. Merritt, 256 S.C. 458, 465, 182 S.E.2d 886, 890 (1971);
Smith v. Winningham, 252 S.C. 462, 166 S.E.2d 825 (1969).

43. 256 S.C. 539, 183 S.E.2d 334 (1971).
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time. Later, the resident eighth circuit judge denied a petition
for writ of habeas corpus. The denial was not appealed. Then,
some fourteen months later, the defendant's counsel submitted
by letter, with prosecution approval, a motion for judgment
non obstante veredicto and, in the alternative, a new trial to
the judge of the fifteenth circuit who had presided at trial.
The judge denied appellant's motions on the merits and appeal
was made to the supreme court.
The supreme court held there was a lack of jurisdiction
and, therefore, the order appealed from was a nullity requiring no consideration or decision by the court. The court stated:
It is clear ...

that the judge had no jurisdiction . . . having long

since adjourned court and departed the circuit.44 The jurisdiction of
a court or of a particular judge over the subject matter of a proceeding depends upon the authority granted by the constitution and laws
of the state, and is fundamental. Lack of jurisdiction of the subject
matter cannot be waived even by consent and therefore such lack can
and should be taken notice of by this Court ex mero motu. 45

Another case which has received much publicity and
deals with the jurisdictional issue is New South Life Ins. Co.
v. Lindsay.4 6 This case came to the supreme court when an
endowment policyholder and party in this action made application to the court in its original jurisdiction for a writ of
prohibition against the Richland County Court to restrain the
county court from further proceedings in this case on the
ground that the county court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter. The New South Life Insurance Co. had commenced the action in an attempt to get the county court to
the company due to an
order a plan of rehabilitation for
47
$8 million deficit in its reserves.
44. Jurisdiction would have been present had the defense counsel made the
motions for a new trial or judgement n.o.v. after the return of the verdict but
before adjournment. Then the motions could have been ruled on by the judge, if
necessary, after he had left the circuit. This holds, with certain exceptions, only
if the motions were made before the judge prior to adjournment of court. For
exceptions and other discussion see generally, Smith v. Quattlebaum, 223 S.C.
384, 76 S.E.2d 154 (1953); Shillito v. City of Spartanburg, 215 S.C. 83, 54
S.E.2d 521 (1949); Burns v. Babb, 190 S.C. 508, 3 S.E.2d 247 (1939).
45. State v. Gorie, 256 S.C. 539, 541, 183 S.E.2d 334, 335 (1971).
46. 258 S.C. 198, 187 S.E.2d 794 (1972).
47. In explaining the rehabilitation plan, the court said at 796 that:
it . .. would permit the insurance company to continue its normal
mode of operation but would impose liens on the cash surrender
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New South alleged in its return to the application to the
supreme court that the county court did, in fact, have jurisdiction over the subject matter involved. This allegation was
in three parts, the first of which stated that the county court
had jurisdiction because New South was seeking a review of
an order of the insurance commissioner pursuant to the
48
Code.
The supreme court found, however, that the insurance company was not seeking a review of the commissioner's decision
but was only seeking the county court's approval of a rehabili49
tation plan.
The insurance company asserted, secondly, that the Richland County Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter
since this was a civil case or special proceeding in which
there is no money demand, and that the cause is one in which
the right involved cannot be monetarily measured.r0 The
supreme court held that the value of the property did exceed
the monetary limit of the county court's jurisdiction and the
right involved could be monetarily measured. 51
New South's third contention was that the county court
should have jurisdiction under a provision of the Code which
relates to aotions for rehabilitation being brought in the circuit courts. 52 New South alleged that §§37-297.1 and 37-297.2
of the South Carolina Code, which would allow the rehabilitation action to be brought in the circuit court, and §15-766
of the Code 53 would combine to give jurisdiction to the Richland County Court. The supreme court, however, pointed out
and loan values of certain policies and the maturity value of endowment policies, all in the amount of 501, such being applicable
to all policies existing as of Dec. 31, 1971.
48. New South claimed that jurisdiction was valid under S.C. CODE ANN.
§15-764.2 (1971 Supp.). Since S.C. CODE ANN. §37-70 (1962) gave circuit courts
authority to review orders of the insurance commissioner on petition of any
aggrieved party, the county court under §15-764.2 should also be able to con-

duct the review, stated New South.
49. New South Life Ins. Co. v. Lindsay, 258 S.C. 198, 203, 187 S.E.2d
794, 798 (1972).
50. S.C.

CODE

ANN. §15-764, as amended (1971 Supp.).

51. New South Life Ins. Co. v. Lindsay, 258 S.C. 198, 205, 187 S.E.2d 794,
798 (1972).
52. S.C.

CODE ANN.

53. S.C. CODE

ANN.

§37-297.1 (1971 Supp.).

§15-766 (1962).
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that §15-766 does not confer jurisdiction on the county court.5 4
Jurisdiction must first be present before §15-766 would operate to give the Richland County Court authority to act on
this matter. Jurisdiction was not present in New South, as
the supreme court indicated, because the value of the property
exceeded the jurisdictional limit of the county court.
V.

LOWER COURTS OR BODIES ACTING IN AN
APPELLATE CAPACITY

In City of Greenville v. Bryant5 5 the Greenville City
Council revoked the business license of the Carolina Book
Store because of its sale of "obscene" material. The city
council provided the operators of the bookstore, appellants in
this action, with an adversary hearing into the matter and
revocation of the license was the result reached by council.
Appellants, upon application, had the action of the council
reviewed upon certiorari by the judge of the thirteenth circuit. The judge refused to allow additional testimony to be
heard by the court and, after review of the record and exhibits that had been before the city council, he affirmed the
council decision.
Several issues were raised on appeal to the supreme
court.5 1 The appellants contended, inter alia, that the court
below had erred in failing to allow the admission of further
testimony or evidence other than that presented at the council
hearing. The supreme court found no error in the decision of
the court below and stated:
Counsel for the parties agreed that the matter would be heard by the
lower court as if 'on appeal and/or certiorari' from the ruling of City
Council. The circuit judge therefore properly considered that the matter was before him on certiorari [and] ... review was properly
limited to the record of the proceedings and evidence upon which City
Council acted in revoking the license. Appellants were not entitled
57
to a trial de novo.
54. New South Life Ins. Co. v. Lindsay, 258 S.C. 198, 205, 187 S.E2d 794,
798 (1972).
55. 257 S.C. 448, 186 S.E.2d 236 (1972).
56. One of those issues, the constitutionality of certain sections of the city
code, was discussed earlier under section I.E. of this survey. In addition, the
review of certain books admitted into evidence during city council proceedings
and the issue of what constitutes obscene material were discussed by the court.
57. City of Greenville v. Bryant, 257 S.C. 448, 453, 186 S.E2d 236, 238
(1972), accord, Whisonant v. Belue, 127 S.C. 483, 121 S.E. 360 (1924) ; City
of Columbia v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm., 242 S.C. 528, 131 S.E.2d 705 (1963).
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VI.

APPEAL FROM INTERLOCUTORY ORDER AS TO
LIABILITY ALONE

Nauful v. Milligan 58 was an action for damages for an
assault and battery which occurred when the defendant hit
the plaintiff because he had made derogatory remarks to the
defendant's 11 and 13 year old boys. The plaintiff moved
below for summary judgment on the issue of liability only
and this motion was granted. The issue of damages remained
for determination. The defendant appealed to the supreme
court.
The main issue of concern here was whether the defendant could appeal the summary judgment or whether the
lower court's order was non-appealable due to its interlocutory
nature. The supreme court addressed this issue by reference
to the South Carolina Code and the Circuit Court Rules.
First, the court determined that the summary judgment
as to liability alone was interlocutory 59 and then held that
an interlocutory order on the merits was appealable. 60
The supreme court found the trial court was not in error
in granting a summary judgment on the liability issue but
did find the lower court erred when it attempted to decide
what testimony would be admissible in the trial on the damages issue. The court said, ". . . the lower court had no
authority to rule upon the admissibility of testimony at a
subsequent trial to determine damages."6 1 Therefore, the
judgment was affirmed in regard to granting summary judgment and reversed concerning what would be admissible in
a later trial on the issue of damages.
VII.
A.

FEDERAL COURTS

Requirements for Removing from State to Federal Courts

South Carolinav. Moore62 involved a petition for habeas
corpus. A state prisoner accused of murder sought removal
of his case to federal court by a petition filed on the morning
his trial was to convene in state court. The state court trial
58. 258 S.C. 139, 187 S.E.2d 511 (1972).
59. S.C. CODE ANN., Circuit Court Rules 44(a) and 44(b) (1962).
60. S.C. CODE ANN. §15-123(1) (1962).
61. Nauful v. Milligan, 258 S.C. 139, 147, 187 S.E.2d 511, 515 (1972).

62. 447 F.2d 1067 (1971).
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judge proceeded with the trial nevertheless, so the defendant
then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and requested
an order to stop further state action. This petition did not
get immediate action by a district judge, and the defendant
was convicted in state court of manslaughter and sentenced
to three years imprisonment. When the matter did receive
the district judge's attention, he denied the removal petition
and all other relief sought and remanded the case to state
court. The defendant appealed.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed two major
areas in announcing its decision. The first matter of concern
was the defendant's right to remove the case to federal court.
The court held that the defendant's contention that his rights
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were violated was in
error. 3
Secondly, the court reluctantly 64 found that the defendant must be relieved of his state court conviction due to
violation of the United States Code,6 5 a provision of which
stops state proceedings from the time removal petition is
filed until the case is remanded. Since the state court proceeded to conviction rather than discontinuing proceedings
against the defendant, its conviction could not stand.
The court pointed out that prior to 1948, the removal
in civil rights cases was controlled by 28 U.S.C.A. Section 74,
which would have allowed the state proceedings to remain
valid, even if conducted after the filing of the removal petition
and prior to a federal court order remanding the case to the
state. The court, however, held the 1948 revision, which to
63. Id. at 1069-1072. The distinction drawn by the court was that the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 protects the legal rights of law abiding citizens and not
the illegal act of "self help". The defendant admitted committing the homicide
but claimed the right of self help in exercising his guaranteed rights. Though
the defendant had the legal right to be in a place of public accommodation,
he could not forcefully assert that right through violence. The court found
no such protection was provided in the 1964 Civil Rights Act and therefore
the removal petition had been properly denied by the district judge.
64. The court, at 1074, expressed concern with the required interpretation
of §1446 and saw the possibility of abuse by persons whose only desire was to
interfere with and delay state trials. Several possible solutions to this potential
problem were recommended for Congressional action among which were the
reinstatement of the pre-1948 procedure discussed briefly below in the survey
text.
65. 28 U.S.C. §1446(e) (1970).
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date has not been materially changed, would invalidate the
state proceedings conducted in the post-petition/pre-remand
interval. 66 The court stated:
It is clear, however, that Section 1446, in providing for the filing of

the petition in the district court while promptly thereafter filing a copy
in the state court and giving notice to adverse parties was designed
to make the removal effective by the performance of those acts. The
removal was no longer dependent upon any judicial act in any state
67
or federal court.

The court ordered defendant Moore's conviction voided
and ordered a writ of habeas corpus to issue commanding his
release, subject to the state's right to retry him.
B. Extention of Time for Filing Notice of Appeal
In Chinese Maritime Trust, Ltd. v. Carolina Shipping

Co. 68 an employee of Carolina Shipping was injured on board

a ship owned by Chinese Maritime Trust, Ltd. of London. The
accident occurred while the ship was in port at Charleston
Harbor.
The employee sued Chinese Maritime for recovery on his
injuries and it in turn brought action for indemnity against
the Carolina Shipping Co., charging that Carolina Shipping
had breached their warranty of workmanlike performance.
In this third-party suit by Chinese Maritime, the district
court determined the employee was injured through his own
negligence and, therefore, judgment was for the stevedore,
Carolina Shipping, since they were deemed not to have
breached their warranty.
The fourth circuit reversed the district court, however,
based on a case 69 decided subsequent to the district judge's
decision but prior to the appeal reaching the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The issue in the cross-appeal, however, is the significant
area in regard to the appeal survey. Carolina Shipping alleged that Chinese Maritime waited too long in filing its
notice of appeal and in securing permission to file late. The
judgment below was entered on April 22. According to the
66.
67.
68.
69.

S.C. v. Moore, 447 F.2d 1067, 1072-73 (1971).
Id. at 1073.
456 F.2d 192 (1972).
United States Lines v. Jarka Corp. of Baltimore, 444 F.2d 26 (1971).
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Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 7 0 Chinese Maritime
had thirty days to give notice of appeal. It did not note its
intention to appeal until June 1. On June 1, Chinese Maritime
filed for an extention of time and, at the same time, filed a
notice of appeal. Later, on June 29, the district judge held a
hearing on the extension and granted it for reasons of "excusable neglect." The extension was for an additional thirtyday period from the end of the first thirty-day period and
thereby validated the June 1 notice of appeal.
Evans v. Jones,7 1 the case cited by the court as authority
for their decision was a 1966 fourth circuit case in which the
appellant was one day late in filing due to a delay" in mail
service. According to Evans:
A finding by the District Judge that the delay in filing was excusable
vill validate a late filing provided the effect is not to extend the time
for filing moie than thirty days from the expiration of the original
72
thirty day period.

The court in Chinese Maritime found that the notice of
appeal fell well within the extension and found the contention
of Carolina Shipping that the district judge could not retroactively permit filing of notice of appeal after more than sixty
days following judgment to be in error. The district judge had
granted the retroactive extension at the hearing on June 29,
which was in excess of sixty days from the April 22 judgment, but the court approved this procedure as long as the
notice of appeal was filed within the extension period.
WALLACE H. CHENEY

70. F.R.A.P. Rule 4(a), 28 U.S.C. (1970).
71. 366 F.2d 772 (1966).
72. Id. at 773.
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